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WATERSHED PLANNING DEFINED
Watershed planning is a term used to describe efforts to protect
and enhance water quality using a watershed as the geographic area of
focus. Watershed planning has its origins in federal programs estab* Originally published as Technical Report No. 9 at the Rocky Mountain Land
Use Institute, this paper has since been revised and updated. Original material reprinted with permission from the Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute.
* A graduate of the University of Colorado School of Law, Barbara J. B. Green
also holds a Masters in Public Administration. A current member of the Colorado
Mined Land Reclamation Board and the Colorado Water Quality and Mining Task
Force, Ms. Green is a shareholder with the Denver firm of Hale, Hackstaff, Laitos,
Green, & Tymkovich, and practices in the areas of land use and environmental law.
Jon B. Alby is a third year student at the University of Denver College of Law.
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lished by the Federal Clean Water Act,' but it is inherently interjurisdictional and interdisciplinary requiring both cooperation among
several units of government and the integration of two discrete disciplines-water quality management and land use planning. A typical
watershed does not stop at the boundaries of a political jurisdiction,
and, although a watershed plan may be based initially on federal policies and funding, its implementation is in large part through local
government ordinances and regulations.
In the past, most important water resource management decisions
have been made at the federal and state level with little input from
municipal and county governments. With the increasing awareness of
the relationship between land use activities and water pollution, local
government involvement has become a critical component to water
quality protection. However, land use planning and regulation typically address land use activities from a single jurisdictional perspective,
whereas watersheds reflect topographic drainage patterns rather than
political borders. Rarely is land ownership, much less control, vested
in a single entity in a major watershed.! Successful watershed planning, therefore, requires an emphasis on regional planning. A watershed focus can facilitate attention to physical and biological, as opposed to purely chemical impacts to a waterbody. It also involves water
pollution prevention and restoration of a watershed, rather than the
mere mitigation of ongoing harm.'
Watershed planning is also the only way to address water pollution
from nonpoint sources of pollution which remain largely unregulated.
A major strategy for attacking nonpoint pollution is to reduce surface
runoff from land use activities through a watershed strategy for an entire watershed that relies on land use planning and controls implemented by local governments. Local management based on a watershed approach allows programs to target the worst causes of polluted
run-off and to implement the combination of solutions tailored to the
conditions of each watershed.5
AUTHORITY FOR WATERSHED PLANNING
FEDERAL APPROACHES

Under the regulatory scheme established by the Clean Water Act,
water quality is either affected by "point source" or "nonpoint source"
pollution. The term point source means "any discernable, confined
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1995).
2. Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers To Watershed Protection, 25 ENVrL. L. 973,
991-92 (1995).
3. Id.at995.
4. See David Zaring, FederalLegislative Solutions to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution, 26 ELR 10128 (1996); Daniel R.Mandelker, ControllingNonpoint Source Pollution:
Can It Be Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 479, 480 (1989).
5. Adler, supra note 2, at 994.
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and discrete conveyance. 6 In contrast, nonpoint sources include atmospheric deposition, contaminated sediments, and land use activities
that generate polluted run-off, such as construction, agriculture, logging, mining and on-site sewage disposal.7 In recognition of a widelyheld antipathy toward federal involvement in the regulation of land
use on private land, the only activities subject to federal regulation under the Clean Water Act are those activities associated with a point
source discharge of pollution." Thus, nonpoint source pollution remains the greatest cause of water pollution. 9 However, several sections
of the Clean Water Act establish a framework for addressing both
point and nonpoint water quality on a watershed basis.'l
Section 208 Areawide Waste Treatment Management Plans.
Watershed planning has its origins in Section 208 of the Clean Water Act." Although this was the first formal acknowledgment by Congress of nonpoint source pollution, the 208 program has been criticized as a toothless system. Even though the Senate has emphasized
that it "clearly intended § 208 to produce specific nonpoint source
abatement programs,"" § 208 efforts are largely unfunded and remain
voluntary.
Section 208 requires states to designate boundaries of areas in the
state "[w]hich as a result of urban industrial concentrations or other
factors has substantial water quality control problems..." and to desorganizations "[c]apable of developing
ignate representative
.
,,T4 effective
areawide waste treatment management plans for such area. 4 Section
208 also requires agencies to plan for point source regulatory programs and develop programs for identifying and controlling nonpoint
source pollution from agriculture, silviculture, mining construction,
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1995).
7. Office of Water, United States Environmental Protection Agency, National Water
Quality Inventory: 1992 Report to Congress (EPA 841-R-94-001) (Mar. 1994).
8. An exception to this general rule is activities that require a federal license or
permit which must demonstrate that they will comply with state water quality standards
and requirements through a "401 Certification" required by § 401 of the Clean Water
Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1995).
9. See Association of State of Inter-state Water Pollution Control Administrators,
America's Clean Water: The State's Nonpoint Source Assessment (1985), reprinted in Impact of
Nonpoint Source Pollution on Coastal Water Quality: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment and the Subcomm. on
Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 84-110 (1988); EPA, National Water QualityInventory, supra note 7.
10. For a complete list of all federal programs and initiatives that are intended to
reduce water pollution see generally, United States General Accounting Office, Water
Quality: A Catalog of Related FederalPrograms (GAO/RCED-96-173) (June 19, 1996).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1995).
12. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(11) (1995). See generally, Richard A. March et al., Nonpoint Source Water Pollution § 208 Planning: Legal and Institutional Issues, 1981-1982
AGRuC. L. J. 324, 349 (explaining § 208 promoted voluntary compliance by planning
agencies rather than mandatory control of nonpoint source pollution).
13. S. Rep. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1977).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a)(1)-(2) (1995).
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urban run-off and related activities.
According to one court,
"[s] ection 208 charts a course not only for cleaning up polluted waters,
but also for the prevention of future pollution by identifying problem
sources, regulating construction of certain industrial facilities, and developing processes to control run-off sources of pollution." 5 Implicit
in the structure of § 208 is the notion that these so-called processes to
control run-off implicate local government land use controls.
Section 319 Nonpoint Source Management
The 1987 amendments to § 319 of the Clean Water Act 6 provide
for the development of nonpoint source management programs by the
states. Pursuant to this statute, states must: (1) identify waters not attaining water quality standards without additional nonpoint source
controls, and (2) identify best management practices for categories of
nonpoint source problems, along with programs, to implement best
management practices to address these nonpoint sources. Section 319
is intended to operate principally through financial incentives providing federal matching funds for nonpoint source projects to states with
approved management programs. Even though § 319 added nonpoint
source pollution control to the Clean Water Act's other goals, many
commentators believe implementation of 319 has not been effective."
Total Daily Maximum Loads
Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act 9 requires that a state establish waste load allocations for point sources and load allocations for
nonpoint sources for certain waterbodies. Together, these allocations
comprise the total maximum daily load ("TMDL") for a waterbody.
The TMDL is a mechanism for water-quality based control actions
where technology-based controls alone are not adequate to meet water
quality standards. 0 TMDL calculations ensure that the cumulative impacts of multiple point sources are accounted for and evaluated in
conjunction with nonpoint sources in an integrated, basin-wide approach to identifying and resolving water pollution.2
15. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 395 F. Supp. 1386, 1389 (D. D.C.
1975).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)-(b) (1995).
17. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (1995).
18. See
(1993).

ROBERT

W.

ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER AcT TWENTY YEARS LATER,
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19. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1995).
20. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) (1997).
21.

A series of cases have been brought by the United States forcing states to com-

ply with § 303(d) requirements to establish total maximum daily loads for all water
quality limited stream segments. Section 303 total daily maximum load cases of note
include: Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984); Sierra Club v.
Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Minn. 1993); Alaska Ctr. For The Env't v. Browner, 20
F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994); Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. Fox,. 909 F.Supp 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962 (W.D.

Wash. 1996).
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Stormwater Regulation
Although technically not a watershed planning provision, Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") stormwater regulation program does address some aspects of run-off. Because EPA has not been
given the authority to regulate nonpoint sources, the stormwater management program is limited to regulating stormwater's entry into or
22
passage through a point source.
Section 402(p) of the Clean Water
2
Act requires certain stormwater discharges collected into point
sources to obtain a discharge permit. Under the stormwater program,
permits are required for stormwater discharges associated with categories of activities, including mineral extraction, manufacturing, hazardous waste facilities, landfills, recycling facilities, power generation,
transportation, sewage treatment, construction disturbing more than
five acres of land, and certain "light" industries. 4
There are three types of National Pollutant Discharge Emission
Standards ("NPDES") permits for discharges composed entirely of
stormwater: individual, general, and group. Individual permits set
specific numerical effluent limitations and are similar to standard
NPDES permits, while general and group permits use pollution prevention rather than end-of-the-pipe treatment and require the discharger to implement "best management practices" ("BMPs"). BMPs
are techniques that are designed to reduce contact of stormwater runoff with raw materials, machinery and waste.
EPA Watershed Policies
Several EPA policy documents have emphasized the importance of
watershed planning. The term "watershed," as used in EPA policy
documents, refers to a "geographic area in which water sediments and
dissolved materials drain to a common outlet-a point on a larger
stream, a lake, an underlying aquifer, an estuary or an ocean. This
area is also called the drainage basin of the receiving water body."25
EPA's watershed protection approach is built on three main principles.
First, the target watersheds should be those where pollution poses the
greatest risk to human health, ecological resources, desirable uses of
the water, or a combination of these. Second, all parties with a stake in
a specific local situation should participate in the analysis of problems
and the creation of solutions. Finally, the actions undertaken should
draw on the full range of methods and tools available for integrating
26
them into a coordinated, multi-organization attack on the problem.

22. See Brian Weeks, Trends in Regulation of Stormwater and Nonpoint Source Pollution,
25 ELR 10300, (June 1995).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (1995).

24. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b) (14) (i)-(xi) (1996).
25.

Office of Water, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Watershed Pro-

tection Approach. Annual Report 1992, (EPA 840-R-93-001) (1993).

26. Id.
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LAND USE REGULATION AND WATERSHED PLANNING
OVERVIEW

Traditional land use regulatory techniques can reduce or eliminate
nonpoint source pollution in several ways. The comprehensive plan
and the zoning ordinance can control the location, type and rate of
new development. Subdivision controls, special overlay districts, special use permits and site plan review processes can include measures
that require mitigation of nonpoint source pollution related to individual land use activities.27
COMPREHENSIVE PLANS
Comprehensive plans establish policies to guide decision-makers
during the land planning process. These plans typically articulate
long-term policies to guide decisions in such areas as transportation,
housing, future land use, water and sewer, and other infrastructure.
As a watershed management tool, a comprehensive plan can include
statements of goals and objectives to address watershed management.
In addition, the comprehensive plan can be used to identify critical areas for water quality protection such as open space sites, stream corridors, drainage-ways and wetlands. Where an areawide waste water
management plan has been adopted under § 208 of the Clean Water
Act, local government comprehensive plans should incorporate the
policies and strategies identified in the 208 plan.
ZONING REGULATIONS

Zoning regulations usually address the overall density and uses allowed within the geographic area defined for each zoning classification. Typically, development characteristics such as density, height,
setbacks, lot area coverage, impervious surface ratio and access to light
are addressed. Setbacks from streams, lakes and wetlands are frequently required by zoning ordinances to minimize sedimentation,
bank erosion and chemical pollutants from interfering with water
quality.
An alternative to zoning requirements that apply to all zoning
categories is the overlay district. An overlay district establishes additional requirements designed to protect specific environmentally sensitive areas. For example, portions of a watershed may be designated as
an overlay district in which land use activities are regulated to prohibit
degradation to the aquatic habitat. Transfer of development rights
programs can also be used to transfer permitted densities from areas
critical to water quality protection. 8

27. See Mandelker, supra note 4, at 489.
28. See generally Edward H. Ziegler and David F. Kernan, TransferDevelopment Rights,
Technical Services Report No 1, Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute, University of
Denver College of Law (1994).
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One of the most effective zoning tools for minimizing water quality
impacts associated with development is a limitation on the percentage
of a site that may be covered by impervious surfaces." As impervious
coverage increases, the velocity and volume of surface run-off increases
and there is a corresponding decrease in infiltration. Increased runoff results in increased erosion from areas disturbed by construction,
which, in turn, increases sedimentation in adjacent waterbodies. Erosion can also cause loss of streamside habitat and instream habitat as
the stream channel is covered by a blanket of eroded sand and silt.
SUBDIVISION CONTROLS

Another way to protect water quality is through subdivision design
standards. Water quality impacts can be minimized by erosion and
sedimentation control requirements, stormwater management systems,
drainage design standards, landscaping specifications and construction
management practices. To the extent polluted run-off from a subdivision cannot be avoided, developers should be required to mitigate the
impacts of increased polluted run-off through some other project."0
In areas that experience high snowfall, snow storage requirements
can be implemented to ensure that snowmelt does not result in a direct discharge to waterbodies. Subdivision site design standards can
prevent direct stormwater discharge to water bodies by requiring urban runoff to first pass over vegetated, undisturbed land. Site design
standards can prohibit major modifications of stream channels, wetlands or lake shorelines and require that all instream work be avoided.
The design of the subdivision itself can affect water quality by encouraging the clustering of dwelling units and requiring that aquifer
recharge areas, wetlands, steep slopes or other sensitive areas be left
free from development.3 Street widths can be reduced to minimize
paved surface areas and wetlands can be used to filter runoff from the
development before it enters adjacent waterbodies
REGIONAL PLANNING

To effectively employ land use planning and zoning techniques as
a watershed protection tool, cooperation among neighboring units of
government is essential. Typically, land use regulatory authority is coterminous with municipal or county boundaries. However, the need
for a regional approach is evident when communities attempt to protect water quality because water pollution problems do not respect po-

29.

See Chester L. Arnold, Jr. and C. James Gibbons, Impervious Surface Coverage: The

Emergence Of A Key EnvironmentalIndicator,62J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 243 (1996).
30. Summit County, Colorado requires developers to mitigate additions of phosphorous to Lake Dillon on a one to one basis. Some developers have met this requirement by sewering old septic systems.

31. RANDALL ARENDT ET AL., RURAL By DESIGN: MAINTAINING SMALL ToWN
CHARACrER, (1994).
32. PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOuS, 72-74 (1993).
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litical boundaries." Decisions to approve land use activities in one jurisdiction can have adverse water quality impacts on a neighboring,
downstream jurisdiction. Regional planning can encompass strategies
to control these impacts from developments that transcend the
boundaries of individual units of local government. Regional planning may be implemented by multi-state authorities, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority or the Columbia River Gorge Area; associations of municipalities and counties within a particular geographic
area of a state; or by neighboring municipalities within a county. At
least twenty-four states authorize some type of regional planning and
eighteen states authorize the transfer of functions
from one unit of
34
government to another by voluntary agreement.
Recently, a regional planning approach known as the "compact"
has received attention from commentators. 5 This is a voluntary approach to regional cooperation that includes a regional plan and an
ongoing management process for a particular geographic area. Each
unit of government with jurisdiction in that area is a designated
stakeholder. Under the compact approach, each governmental unit
has the option of implementing portions of a regional plan. If it
adopts the plan, it becomes a "participating community" in a compact. 6 The compact approach is ideal for addressing issues on a watershed scale because it integrates units of government horizontally (between neighboring jurisdictions) and vertically (between federal, state
and local levels), all of which may have an impact on water pollution
associated with the use and development of land.
Several states have enacted statutes that confer on local governments the authority to regulate "developments of regional impact"
("DRIs") . Examples include the Georgia Planning Act of 1989, which
authorizes- the Georgia Department of Community Affairs to establish
rules and procedures for local government and regional agency review
of development projects with regional impacts;38 the Cape Cod Commission Act9 which allows the Cape Cod Commission to review, approve, approve with conditions or deny projects with regional impacts;
and the Colorado Areas and Activities of State Interest Acte' which
authorizes municipalities and counties to regulate certain "areas and

33. Marie L. York, Regions: Blind Isolation or Shared Vision?, 47 LAND USE LAW 4, 3
(1995).
34. Patricia E. Salkin, RegionalPlanning:New PoliticalMagnetism, 44 LAND USE LAW 6,

3 (1992).
35.

See generally Paul M. Bray and Patricia E. Salkin "Planningby Compact: A New Re-

gionalApproach, "48 LAND USE LAw 3, 3 (1996).
36. Id.
37. See generally, M. Morris, RegulatingRegional Impacts: Toward Model Legislation, 47
LAND USE LAW 8, 3 (1995).
38. GA. CODEANN. § 50-8.7.1 (1994).
39. 1989 Mass. Acts 716, amended by 1990 Mass. Acts 2 (repealed 1991).
40. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-65.1-101, et seq. (1990) (H.B. 1041). See also, Barbara
Green et al., H.B. 1041: A Voice in the Wilderness, 19 COLO. LAw., No. 11, pp. 2245-47

(Nov. 1990).
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Pursuant to this authority, several Coloactivities of state interest.'
rado municipalities and counties have implemented permit requirements to regulate the impact to water quality caused by matters of state
interest.

LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO WATERSHED PLANNING
SECTION

208 PLANNING: IS IT ALIVE?

The earliest court decision to discuss the validity of water quality
planning under § 208 of the Clean Water Act is Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle4 In that case, the Natural Resources Defense
Council brought an action in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment construing the planning required under § 208.4 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the
district court decision that 208 planning was required throughout a
state, stressing that § 208 "sets up a comprehensive scheme for the
elimination of water pollution in all areas of the state, both urbanindustrial areas and agricultural and forest areas."44
The continued viability of § 208 as a watershed planning tool was
affirmed eleven years later by the Fourth Circuit in Shanty Town Associates Limited Partnershipv. EnvironmentalProtection Agency. A developer
filed suit challenging the EPA's restrictive conditions on funds granted
to the municipality for construction of a sewage collection system. Although the District Court for the District of Maryland held that the developer lacked standing and that its arguments failed on their merits,
the Fourth Circuit granted standing, but held that EPA had the
authority to impose conditions on the grant award to minimize nonpoint source pollution.47 The case involved an EPA imposed condition
on the grant which limited the amount of new development it could
support. The concern was that better sewer service would lead to an
explosion of development which would, in turn, lead to increased
nonpoint source pollution.4 The developer argued that imposition of
this condition by EPA was an unlawful attempt to regulate nonpoint
source pollution.49 The court disagreed, noting that § 208(f) of the
Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to make grants to the states to help

41. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-65.1-101 (1997).
42. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 564 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
43. Id at 575.
44. Id. at 576.
45. Shanty Town Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Environmental Protection Agency, 843
F.2d 782 (4th Cir. 1988).
46. Id. at 784.
47. Id. at 788.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 790.
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defray the costs of developing and administering 208 plans. 50 The
court found that 208 requires plans to contain procedures to identify
and address major sources of nonpoint source pollution, and that
grants for sewer systems are a potential method for controlling nonpoint source pollution."
EXPANDING JURISDICTION UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT

Although the Clean Water Act is designed primarily to control
point source discharges of pollution, EPA and the courts consistently
have taken an expansive view of activities subject to Clean Water Act
regulation, perhaps out of frustration that little has been accomplished
to reduce nonpoint source pollution. Through broad interpretations
of the term "point source" and liberal interpretations of 401 certification powers, the courts and EPA have relied on the Clean Water Act to
address water quality impacts that go well beyond the discharge of pollutants and, arguably, the intended scope of the Clean Water Act.
Is EVERYTHING A POINT SOURCE?

EPA has stated its intent "to embrace the broadest possible definition of point source consistent with the legislative intent of the Clean
Water Act."52 The Director of the Water Management Division of EPA
in Region Eight recently explained that " any seeps coming from identifiable sources of pollution (i.e., mine workings, land application sites,
53
ponds, pits, etc.) would need to be regulated by discharge permits."
Courts have agreed with EPA's broad interpretation of the term point
source, finding that point sources must be interpreted broadly to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Clean Water Act. 54
A case in point arose in Washington where environmental organizations sued Hecla Mining Company for discharging without an
NPDES permit. In Washington Wilderness Coalition v. HECLA Mining
Co., 55plaintiffs argued that tailings ponds were a point source which
required an NPDES permit. The mining company maintained that its
tailing ponds were not point sources but merely "areas of low topography into which mine tailing for mineral processing activities have been
deposited and through which water may percolate."56 The court rejected this argument citing several cases to support the conclusion that
man-made ponds designed to receive tailings are conveyances or containers falling within the definition of point source under the Clean
50. Id. at 791.
51. Id. at 790-91.
52. See 55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 47997 (Nov. 16, 1990) ("Preamble to storm water regulations under NPDES.").
53. Letter from Director of the Water Management Division of EPA, Region 8.
54. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2nd 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979); see
also Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984).
55. Washington Wilderness Coalition v. HECLA Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983 (E.D.
Wash. 1994).
56. Id. at 987.
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Water Act.57 The court narrowed the scope of activities falling under

the nonpoint source designation to "uncollected runoff water from,
for example, oil and gasoline
on a highway which is difficult to attrib58
ute to a single polluter.
Through a similar analysis, acid mine drainage flowing into creeks
has been found to be a pollutant requiring an NPDES permit. In the
case of Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines,59 a federal district court
held that mine audits and pits were point sources requiring a discharge permit. The court rejected the defendants' argument that no
permit was needed because there had been no "addition" of pollutants
as a result of mining.60 The court admonished that "any reliance on
historical pollution to evade current liability misapprehends the focus
of the Clean Water Act." 61 The court based its ruling on the Ninth
Circuit case, Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Utilit 2 in
which a municipal utility and state agency were held liable for discharging without a permit for drainage collected into a dam which,
from time to time, flowed into the river.
The East Bay case raises problematic implications to watershed
planning efforts aimed at restoring waters polluted from historic mining activities. East Bay arose from a lawsuit brought by an environmental group against a municipal utility district and regional waterquality control board for unpermitted discharges under the Clean Water Act.4 The utility district had acquired a portion of an abandoned
mine in the 1960s to build a reservoir. In the 1970s, the district and
the board constructed impoundments, ditches, pipes, valves, culverts,
and channels in an attempt to reduce toxic run-off from the site,
which they continued to operate. From time to time, there were accidental spills from the facility.
Even though this treatment system improved the over-all water
quality of the river, the court found that the discharge of collected
run-off and the accidental spills were a point source subject to the
Clean Water Act's permit requirements.6 5 The defendants conceded
57. Id. at 988, citing, Appalachian Power Company v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373
(4th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing point sources from "unchanneled and uncollected"
surface waters); Consolidated Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d, 239, 249 (4th Cir. 1979)

(explaining that point sources include slurry ponds, drainage ponds, and coal refuse
piles); Sierra Club v. Absten Construction Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating

that gravity flow from rain or run-off water may be part of a point source discharge if
the miner at least initially collected or channeled the water and other materials).
58.

Washington Wilderness Coalition, 870 F. Supp. at 988.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168 (D. Mont. 1995).
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Util., 13 F.3d 305 (9th Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 873 (1994).

63. Id. at 308 (finding that historical level of pollution compared to current level of
pollution emanating from facility was not material to resolution of Clean Water Act

claim that owners and operators were discharging pollutants).
64. Id. at 307.
65. Id. at 308.
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that the acid-mine drainage was a pollutant, and that the facility was a
point source, but they argued that because there was no addition of
pollutants from their activities, they were not liable under the Clean
Water Act.6 Rejecting this argument, the court said that the Clean
Water Act does not require that there be a greater level of pollution
entering the river than before in order to impose liability for discharging pollutants without a permit." Under the reasoning of this case, watershed based efforts to address water pollution caused by abandoned
mines may be chilled because of the fear of incurring Clean Water Act
liability anytime run-off from an abandoned mine is collected or
channeled. Not all courts, however, have agreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that liability arises even where there is not an "addition" of pollutants. For example, in Friends of Santa Fe County v. L. A. C.
Minerals, Inc.,M6 an environmental group brought a citizens' suit to challenge mine remediation work being performed under the oversight of
the State of New Mexico. In that case, the court found that the citizens' suit must prove that the defendants caused an addition of pollutants, because "migration of residual contaminations resulting from
previous releases is not an ongoing discharge under the Act. 69 Other
courts have also held that Clean Water Act permit requirements arise
only where there is an "addition" of pollutants.
DISCHARGES TO GROUNDWATER AS POINT SOURCES

In keeping with the trend to sweep as much as possible under the
definition of point source, the courts have extended federal jurisdiction over point source discharges to address groundwater contamination, even though the Clean Water Act does not directly regulate
groundwater quality. The Clean Water Act makes it unlawful for any
person to discharge any pollutant into navigable waters without a permit."7' Given the Act's purpose to regulate as fully as possible all
sources of water pollution, the Supreme Court has decided that the
term navigable is of "little import." According to the Court, Congress
intended navigable waters to embrace virtually "every creek, stream,
river or body of water that in any way may effect interstate commerce." 73 Congress did not, however, intend to include isolated

66. Id.
67. Id. at 309.
68. Friends of Santa Fe County v. L. A. C. Minerals, Inc., 892 F.Supp. 1333 (D. N.M.
1995).
69. Id. at 1354.
70. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed. v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 589 (6th
Cir. 1988) (hydroelectric dam's facilitation of pollutants already in the water not permittable addition of pollutants); National Wildlife Fed. v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175
(D.C. Cir.1982) (upholding EPA's determination that addition of a pollutant occurs
only if the "point source itself physically introduces pollutants from the outside world).
71. As defined in the Clean Water Act, the term "navigable waters" means "[w]aters
of the United States (§ 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1995)).
72. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
73. Quivera Mineral Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985).
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groundwater as part of the navigable waters.74
Where impacts to tributary groundwater, as opposed to isolated
groundwater, are at issue, the law is not as clear. Courts are split on
the question of whether tributary ground water which is naturally connected to surface water is subject to the Clean Water Act regulation.
On the one hand, some courts have determined that Congress intended regulation of all discharges of pollutants that could affect surface waters of the United States. On the other hand, there are courts
which conclude that the possibility of a hydrologic connection between ground and surface waters is insufficient to trigger Clean Water
Act regulations.
In Washington Wilderness Coalition, the court reasoned that since the goal of the Clean Water Act is to protect the quality of surface waters, any pollutant that enters such waters, whether directly or through ground water, is subject to regulation by a NPDES
permit. It is not sufficient, however, to allege ground water pollution,
and then to assert a general hydrologic connection between all waters.
Rather, pollutants must be traced from their source to surface
waters
78
in order to come within the purview of the Clean Water Act.

EPA interprets its jurisdiction over groundwater to depend on a
connection with surface water. In the preamble to the NPDES permit
regulations for stormwater discharges, EPA states that the rule does
not apply to groundwater "unless there is a hydrologic connection between the ground water and a nearby surface water body."79
FEDERAL LICENSES AND PERMITS: 401 CERTIFICATIONS

Carving out another exception to the general rule that the Clean
Water Act regulates only point source discharges of pollutants, the
United States Supreme Court has given states broad authority under §
401 of the Clean Water Act8 ° to address impacts that are unrelated to
the discharge of pollutants. In PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology,8 the Supreme Court affirmed a Washington
court's decision that allowed a state, through the 401 certification pro74. See Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. GAF Corp., 389
F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
75. See, e.g., Colo. Envt'l Coalition v. Colo. Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434
(D. Colo. 1993) (finding discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters to include
such discharges which reach navigable waters through ground water).
76. See Town of Norfolk v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1450-51
(1st Cir. 1992) (deferring to an agency interpretation excluding ground water from
coverage under the Clean Water Act); Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson
Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Kelly v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 110507 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
77. Washington Wilderness Coalition v. HECLA Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990
(E.D. Wash. 1994); see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 990.
79. NPDES permit regulations and groundwater, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,997
(1990).
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1995).
81. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723
(1994).
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cess, to impose minimum stream flow requirements on a hydroelectric
project. The Court read § 401 to allow a state to impose any condition
for water quality certification necessary to ensure compliance with
state requirements that protect a designated use." In accordance with
this interpretation, the Court held that the minimum flow condition
was necessary to protect the stream for its use as a fishery. 83
A recently decided citizen suit in Oregon is illustrative of the trend
to apply 401 certification for nonpoint source pollution within a watershed. In Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas,8' a collection of environmental groups sued the Unites States Forest Service under the citizens suit provision of the Clean Water Act.85 The groups wanted a
declaratory judgment establishing that applicants for federal grazing
permits are required to obtain state 401 certification to ensure that the
grazing activity will not adversely impact state water quality standards.
Section 401 (a) (1) requires that before a federal permit may be issued
for "any activity
,,87
... which may result in any discharge into navigable
waters .. , a state certificate must be obtained. The forest service argued that the plain meaning of "discharie" is limited to a point source
or a nonpoint source with a conveyance. The court, however, was not
persuaded by this argument and ruled that "discharge" does not restrict the definition to point sources or nonpoint sources with conveyances. 9 The court also held that the Forest Service's interpretation of
the meaning of § 401 is not entitled to any deference because the EPA,
not the Forest Service, administers the Clean Water Act.90 Finally, the
court determined that the legislative history of § 401 (a) reveals a congressional intent to regulate all polluting activities through water quality standards and that there was no distinction between point and
nonpoint sources in the original act.9'
These expansive interpretations of Clean Water Act authority raise
an interesting question for watershed planning professionals. Are
these interpretations based on a fair reading of the Clean Water Act or
are they symptomatic of an increasing awareness that the remaining
water pollution problems are not easily addressed by traditional endof-the-pipe controls? Arguably, a coordinated watershed approach
that features local regulation of land use activities is a better solution

82. Id. at 712.
83. Id. at 719-22; see also Kelley v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 96 F.3d 1482
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
84. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (D. Or. 1996).
85. Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1995).
86. Oregon NaturalDesert Ass'n, 940 F. Supp. at 1536-37.
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1995).
88. Oregon NaturalDesert Ass'n, 940 F. Supp. at 1540.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1541, "Senator Cooper stated that the 1970 Amendments require, without
exception, that all federal activities that have any effect on water quality be conducted
so that water quality standards be maintained," quoting 115 CONG. REc. 28,970 (1969).
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to nonpoint source pollution than an ever-expanding notion of Clean
Water Act authority.
VALIDITY OF LOCAL REGULATION OF WATER QUALITY IMPACTS

Since the 1960s, state legislatures have passed enabling acts to
permit local
protection of certain critical resources, including water
92
Pursuant to these enabling statutes, local governments
resources.
have enacted ordinances to restrict developments in wetlands, farmlands and historic districts and sites."3 Courts have upheld these attempts to address the environmental impacts of land use activities. ° In
some states, legislative enactments expressly authorize some form of
watershed regulation. 5 Local government regulations designed to implement watershed plans can give rise to the same claims that are
raised to challenge any land use regulation, including takings, equal
protection, due process and preemption theories.
TAKINGS, DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Land use regulations designed to protect water quality frequently
include a requirement that a portion of a development site near a waterbody be kept in a natural state. This type of development restriction may give rise to a "takings" claim. In particular, any regulation
that actually requires land to be dedicated to the public should be
carefully considered under the two-part test established by the United
States Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard.96 Under that test, the
dedication requirement must "substantially advance" a legitimate government purpose and the exaction or dedication must be "roughly
proportional"' to the impact of the project.
In Dolan, Mrs. Dolan challenged the requirement to dedicate to
the City all of the land lying within the floodplain of Fanno Creek. 98
The floodplain was designated in the City's Master Drainage Plan
which recommends that it remain free of structures and be preserved
as a greenway. The City's comprehensive plan recommended that the
floodplain be included in the greenway system and the Community
Development Code required dedicating sufficient open space for an
92.

See R. PLATT, LAND USE CONTROLS: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 219,

241 (1991).
93. J.H. WICKERSHAM, THE QUIET REVOLUTION CONTINUES: THE EMERGING NEW

MODEL FOR STATE GROWTH MANAGEMENT STATUTES (1995) (Zoning and Planning Law
Handbook).
City of Colorado Springs v. Board of County Comm'rs, 895 P.2d 1105,
94. See, e.g.,
1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 564 (1995) (upholding county
authority to enact regulations to address impacts to aquatic habitats and wetlands).
95. See, for example: Colorado, COLO. REv.STAT. § 31-15 707(iv)(b) (1997) (authorizing municipalities to regulate in an area five miles from the source of water supply);
North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-214.5 & 143.6(a), 143-215.6(a) (1996).
96. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
97. Id.at 391.
98. Id. at 380-83 (plaintiff also challenged a requirement to dedicate a 15 foot pedestrian/bikeway).
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adjoining greenway within the floodplain.9 The Dolan's did not dispute that establishing a greenway in the floodplain for stormwater control was a legitimate public purpose. Instead, they claimed that there
was not a sufficient nexus between the requirements and the impacts
of the development.
The Supreme Court agreed and explained that under the "roughly
proportional" test: "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required,
but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development."'00 The court was not persuaded
that a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was related to the
City's goal to minimize stormwater run-off or prevent flooding.' The
court confirmed, however, that "increasing the amount of impervious

surface will increase the
quantity and rate of stormwater flow from the
02
petitioner's property.'
In 1987, the Supreme Court, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,03 established the "essential nexus" test for dedications of land developed more fully in Dolan.'04 The Nollan decision found a taking because the Coastal Commission justified exacting an easement along
the front of the property facing the ocean as necessary to obtain access
to the beach.' 0 The court found that the Commission's justification
failed to satisfy the "essential nexus" test.'
From the Supreme Court's point of view regarding land dedications, it appears that mitigating nonpoint source run-off is an appropriate governmental land use goal, but land dedication requirements
may not be the safest solution. Regulations that require parts of a parcel to remain undeveloped (as in the case of stream setbacks) may be a
better way to accomplish the goal.' 7 There may be circumstances,
however, in which only a dedication of property to the public will serve
the public interest in water quality protection. In those cases, the local
government must be prepared to show that there is an essential nexus
between water quality and the dedication and that the extent of the
dedication is roughly proportionate to the water quality impacts of the
development.
Watershed planning efforts by the Lake Tahoe Regional Planning
Authority have generated interesting court decisions discussing the
constitutional validity of various water quality management schemes.

For example, conditions imposed on a development by the Authority
99. Id. at 379.
100. Id. at 391.
101. Id. at 389-91.
102. Id. at 392.
103. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
104. Id. at 836-37.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 838.
107. For an excellent discussion of Dolan and post-Dolan decisions, see Nancy E.
Stroud & Susan L. Trevarthen, Defensible Exactions After Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 Stetson L. REv. 719 (1996).
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survived a takings challenge in Leroy Land Development v. Tahoe Regional
PlanningAuthority.' In that case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower
court's decision that offsite mitigation conditions to protect water
quality failed to advance the governmental purpose of protecting Lake
Tahoe.' Persuaded by the fact that the interstate compact forming
the regional authority was created to minimize the adverse effect of
urbanization due to erosion and pollution, the Ninth Circuit held that
the off-site mitigation requirements were designed to "ameliorate erosion, destabilization and other adverse environmental effects . . ." and
directl' furthered the governmental interest underlying the regulations.
In another Lake Tahoe case, a property owners' association challenged as a takings a lake pollution mitigation fee assessed at the time
of building permit issuance. In Tahoe Keys Property Owners'Ass'n v. State
Water Resources Control,"' the court found that the justification for the
regulation need not be limited to the needs or burdens created by the
subject property alone."2 According to the court, the plaintiffs were
not unfairly singled out because: (1) the regulations to protect the
(2)
lake, if not this particular fee, applied to all property owners, and
3
regulation of the property was the only way to protect the lake."
Courts have been clear and consistent in requiring some kind of
relationship between conditions imposed on land use approvals to address water quality and the water quality impacts of a development
proposal. A case in point arose where a developer was compelled to
purchase land and install a drainage system that would serve other developments in a watershed area and the county failed to require repayment of a portion of the costs by future developers. In Christopher
Lake Development Co. v. St. Louis County,"' the court found that the
drainage system requirement violated the developer's due process and
equal protection rights because he was forced to pay more than his
share of costs that should have been allocated throughout the watershed." The case was remanded to the district court with instructions
to determine the proper cost allocation scheme.
In Florida, in the case of Villas of LakeJackson v. Leon County,"6 a developer sued a county challenging on equal protection and due process theories a rezoning ordinance designed to address water quality
impacts to a watershed." 7 The rezoning was based on documented
108. Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Auth., 939 F.2d 696, 697-99 (9th Cir.
1991).
109. Id.at 699.
110. Id.
111. Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 988 (1944).
112. Id. at 745.
113. Id. at 746-48.
114. Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 1275.
116. Villas of LakeJackson v. Leon County, 884 F. Supp. 1544 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
117. Id. at 1548.
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concerns about stormwater runoff further deteriorating the nearby
lake's water quality. In that case, during the county's process of reviewing and approving a 1972 development proposal, the impact of
drainage from the development on Lake Jackson became an issue. Accordingly, the developer agreed to install a stormwater management
system before any development commenced on the project. "8 A
drainage system was designed and built at a cost of $45,000 with a capacity larger than would have been necessary for the developer's property alone. In 1989, the county down-zoned the property from multifamily to estate zoning because of the water quality concerns associated
with denser development and prohibited development within an area
adjacent to the lake. The developer sued the county claiming, inter
alia, that the zoning ordinance violated its due process rights and denied equal protection." 9
The due process claim failed because the developer did not demonstrate a protected property right under state law. With regard to
the equal protection claim, plaintiffs identified several properties in
the Lake Jackson drainage area which they contended were treated
differently. The court examined the county ordinance under a traditional equal protection test and reiterated the Supreme Court's view in
Nordlingerv. Hahn;2' equal protection challenges that do not involve a
suspect class or a fundamental right simply require the ordinance in
question be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest" to withstand a facial challenge.122 An ordinance must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonable conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.122 In light
of these lenient standards, the federal district court found that Leon
County's interest in protecting the water quality of Lake Jackson
through development restrictions was related to a legitimate and important county interest.2 4 The court also found that density limits and
setbacks around the lake were related in a rational way to that interest.125
Next, the court considered plaintiff's claim that the county intentionally singled out plaintiffs denying them equal protection of the
law.' 26 The court relied on Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
HousingDevelopment Corp., 7 which held that purposeful discrimination
118. Id. at 1551.
119. Id. at 1548.
120. Id. at 1555.
121. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
122. Villas of Lake Jackson, 884 F. Supp. at 1577.
123. See FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
124. Villas of LakeJackson, 884 F. Supp. at 1577-78.
125. Setback requirements usually withstand challenges. See e.g., Threat v. Fulton
County, 467 S.E.2d 546, 550 (Ga. 1996) (upholding a county requirement that prohibited development from disturbing vegetation within 50 feet of a river).
126. Villas of LakeJackson,884 F. Supp. at 1577.
127. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977).
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can be indirectly proven by a "stark pattern" of adverse impact on a
particular group, and examined whether the evidence of differing
treatment revealed a pattern of irrationality.12 The court held that as
long as there is a rational basis for the differing treatment, an as applied equal protection claim will not prevail.'9 The court also noted
that the Supreme Court has recognized that it may be very difficult to
show unequal application of the zoning ordinance since each parcel
can be unique.' Because the county had been concerned about protecting the water quality of Lake Jackson for many years and had been
studying a comprehensive plan for the entire drainage basin, the court
found that the plan was not aimed at plaintiffs property.
These cases illustrate that watershed protection schemes are evaluated under the same standards that apply to any land use regulations.
132
Clearly, watershed protection is a legitimate governmental purpose.
Setback requirements, impervious surface restrictions and density controls are all appropriate tools to protect water quality and dedications
of land for water quality purposes will be subject to scrutiny under the
Dolan test which requires that the dedication be "roughly" proportionate to the impacts of the proposed land use. Equal protection challenges of watershed regulations are likely to fail, even if parcels of
property are treated differently, so long as the differing treatment is
related to a comprehensive water quality management program.
FEDERAL OR STATE PREEMPTION

The implementation of a watershed plan through local land use
regulations may trigger challenges on the basis of federal or state preemption. Implementing regulations will be adjudged under the usual
standards applied by the courts to resolve preemption questions. Preemption challenges to watershed planning typically arise either where
watershed regulations are applied to projects located on federal lands
or where they allegedly conflict with state or federal water quality laws.
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,133 the United
States Supreme Court characterized the federal preemption test as
whether there is either an "actual conflict between state and federal

128.

Villas of Lake Jackson, 884 F. Supp. at 1577.

129.
130.

Id. at 1579.
Id. See also Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 193 (1994) (stating that "city's general plan and water
moratorium were rational).
131. Villas of Lake Jackson, 884 F. Supp. at 1579. Also applying a traditional due process and equal protection analysis is City of Austin v. Quick, 930 S.W.2d 678, 692 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1996) (holding that city ordinance limiting amount of impervious cover in

watershed zone did not violate either due process or equal protection).
132. See, e.g., ACW Realty Management, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Westfield, 662 N.E.2d
1051 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996), see also Connecticutt Resources Recovery Auth. v. Planning
and Zoning Comm'n of Wallingford, 626 A.2d 705, 716 (Conn. 1993) (finding that
"zoning regulation prohibiting solid waste disposal over an aquifer was a valid exercise
of police power).

133. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
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law", or a "congressional expression of intent to preempt.' ', 4 Local
regulations which reflect the exercise of police powers will be preempted by federal statutes only "if that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress., 13 5 Under these tests, federal preemption becomes a
question of statutory interpretation and analysis. An actual conflict
be6
tween state and federal law requires that the former give way.1
Where a project is located on federal land, state or local regulations designed to address water quality impacts will probably survive
preemption attacks, at least with respect to federal land management
statutes. According to the Supreme Court's holding in Granite Rock,
local government regulations that seek to categorically prohibit activities on federal land will be preempted by federal land management
acts but regulations that seek to regulate the environmental impacts of
projects on federal lands would not be preempted by those acts." 7
Under this distinction, a county could not zone federal lands to categorically exclude land uses allowed by federal law. It could, however,
impose regulations on land uses intended to ensure that adverse water
quality impacts would be mitigated.
Watershed regulations may also be challenged under theories that
they are preempted by federal and state water quality regulatory
schemes. Given the point source focus of the Clean Water Act and
federal policies that reserve to state and local governments the authority to regulate nonpoint sources, most land use regulations addressing
water quality impacts of land use activities should survive preemption
attacks brought under the Clean Water Act.
Courts have evaluated whether the Clean Water Act preempts local
water quality regulations in a variety of cases. In Welch v. Board of Supervisors, a county ordinance banning land application of sewage
sludge was held not to be preempted by the Clean Water Act because
the ban does not conflict with Clean Water Act sludge disposal policies
and more stringent county land ban regulations are expressly allowed
by regulation. 3 In Holiday Point Marina v. Anne Arundel County,40 a
Maryland appellate court found that Army Corps of Engineers' review
under the Clean Water Act and Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act
permit requirements did not preempt a zoning ordinance prohibiting
marina development within a specific distance of shellfish beds.'

134. Id. at 580-81.
135. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 3311 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1982), Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
136. Ray, 435 U.S. at 168-69.
137. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 1428-29.
138. Welch v. Bd. of Supervisors, 888 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. Va. 1995).
139. Id. at 756-57.
140. Holiday Point Marina v. Anne Arundel County, 666 A.2d 1332 (Md. App.
1996).
141. Id. at 1338.
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Whether state law preempts local government water quality ordinances
is a question of state statutory interpretation. 42

142. See, e.g., Water Quality Ass'n v. County of Santa Barbara, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184,
191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding county ordinance governing water softeners in conflict with and preempted by state law); City and County of Denver v. Bd. of County
Commissioners, 782 P.2d 753, 765 (Colo. 1989) (holding that state water rights administration statute did not completely exempt water projects from local government
regulations); State College Borough Water Auth. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 659 A.2d 640,
645 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (finding that county regulations requiring domestic water
system development not significantly deteriorate wetlands or degrade natural scenic
were enacted pursuant to statutory authority to impose more stringent regulations.).

